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1 Introduction 
Cryptosystems are a crucial technology for maintaining the security of IT and loT sys-
terns. When sending confidential messages via the Internet, we should consider using a 
cryptosystem to encrypt them to keep secrecy throughout the communication channels. 
Cryptosystems are categorized as secret-key and public-key cryptosystems. Figure 1 il-
lustrates how secret-key cryptosystems work. Sender Alice uses a shared key to encrypt a 
plaintext message into a ciphertext, which she sends to receiver Bob, who uses the same 
key to decrypt the ciphertext. The sender and receiver must securely exchange the shared 
key before communicating. 
凰
ciphertext 
豆plaintext "#'Ei3o48PsiYS" plaintext "Hello!" "Hello!" 
Encryption Decryption 
Alice ． Bob 
Shared key Shared key 
Figure 1: Encryption and decryption in a secret-key cryptosystem 
One problem with secret-key cryptosystems is how to securely exchange the shared key. 
A trivial answer is for Alice and Bob to directly exchange it, but public-key cryptosystems 
provide a more elegant solution. Public-key cryptosystems utilize two keys, a public key 
and a private key, which are respectively used in the encryption and decryption phases. 
Figure 2 illustrates how public-key cryptosystems work. Bob (the receiver) generates the 
two keys and sends only his public key to Alice. Alice (the sender) is then able to use 
the public key to encrypt a shared key and to send it to Bob. Bob recovers the shared 
key by decrypting the ciphertext using his private key. The key point here is that Bob 
securely obtains the shared key, even when his public key is available on the Internet or 
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other network. This works due to the computational complexity of a problem on which 
the security of the public-key cryptosystem depends. In the case of RSA, this underlying 
problem is integer factorization, which is well known as a computationally hard problem. 




Alice Encryption Decryption Bob 
n ， 
’ Bob's public key Bob's p『ivatekey 
Figure 2: Encryption and decryption in a public-key cryptosystem 
However, Shor presented algorithms for using a quantum computer to break RSA [2] 
and elliptic-curve cryptosystems [1] in a short time. There are predictions that quantum 
computers will break 2048-bit RSA with a probability of 1/2 by 2031 [3]. Research 
and standardization of post-quantum cryptosystems (PQCs) with the potential to resist 
attacks by quantum computers are beginning to evolve. This article surveys leading PQCs 
that are candidates for the NIST PQC standardization1, and discusses their problems. 
We also describe potential technical directions for addressing those problems. 
2 Preliminaries 
This section describes the technical foundations of cryptosystems. Cryptosystems com-
prise keys and algorithms. An algorithm is also called a scheme or protocol. There are 
public and private keys, which work as described in the previous section. The algorithms 
perform encryption, decryption, and key generation, the latter of which usually takes pa-
rameters to produce a computationally hard problem that the system's security depends 
on. 
In the case of RSA cryptosystems, security depends on an integer factorization problem. 
Even with state-of-the-art technology, a composite number with more than 2048 bits 
cannot be factored in real time2. Parameters are thus the bit length of composite number 
N and the bit length of N's prime factors p and q, which are set as 2048 and 1024, 
respectively. In the key generation algorithm, we first generate two distinct 1024-bit 
prime numbers p and q and calculate N by multiplying p and q. The composite number 
1 National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST), where is US standardization institute, started the standardiza-
tion proces for PQC from December 2017. 
2We assume composite numbers with only two distinct prime factors of the same bit length. 
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N is the public key. The private key is a positive integer d satisfying the relation 
ed三 1mod (p -l)(q -1), (1) 
where e isan arbitrarily defined positive integer other than 1. The key generation al-
gorithm calculates e from d by applying the extend Euclid's algorithm to Eq. (1). The 
encryption algorithm requires an integer m in the range [O, N -1], which plaintext M is 
encoded into, and calculates 
c=me modN, 
where c isthe ciphertext. Note that a 2048-bit N is sufficient to encode the shared key, the 
size of which is less than or equal to 256 bits. The decryption algorithm allows recovery 
of the plaintext m as 
cd = med = m mod N . 
Since the order of the irreducible residue class group N/NZ is <I>(N) = (p-l)(q-1), the 
relation med= m mod N holds by Fermat's theorem. 
The above procedure is summarized as follows: 
• Parameters 
l. Nzen: the bit length of composite number N 
2. Pien: the bit length of odd primes p and q, which are factors of N. 
• Keys 
1. Public key: a composite number N and positive integer e 
2. Private key: a positive integer d satisfying ed三 1mod (p -1) (q -l) 
• Key generation 
1. Bob selects two primes p and q with Plen bits. Generating these prime numbers 
is easy with efficient primality testing algorithms such as the Miller-Rabin test 
or the Cohen-Lenstra test. 
2. Bob computes the composite number N(= pq). 
3. Bob selects a positive integer e in the range [2, (p -l)(q -1). 
4. Bob applies Euclid's algorithm to computed by solving ed三 1mod (p-l)(q-1). 
• Encryption 
1. Alice encodes message Minto the integer m(E {O, • • •, N -l}). 
2. Alice computes c =吋 modN.
3. Alice sends ciphertext c to Bob. 
• Decryption 
1. Bob computes cd三 med三 mmodN.
2. Bob recovers plaintext M from m. 
The next section describes the parameters, keys, and algorithms for leading PQCs in 
a similar way as above. 
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3 Post-quantum cryptosystems 
This section describes current leading PQCs. 
3.1 Lattice-based cryptosystem 
Lattice-based cryptosystems are well-studied PQC candidates. The security of these cryp-
tosystems depends on the shortest or closest vector problems, which are NP-hard. The 
learning-with-error (LWE) problem is a widely used instance of these problems. Let q be 
a positive integer, A be a matrix in GLn(lFq), and e, s, b be n-dimensio叫凡 vectorsin 
the relation 
b = As+e. (2) 
The LWE problem requires finding vectors e and s from given A and b, where e isa small 
nonzero vector of elements sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution. Elements in lFq 
are set as {O, 1, • • •, q-1} or {-(q-1)/2, • • •, -1, 0, 1, • • •, (q-1)/2}.3 If vector e equals 
zero, this problem is equivalent to solving a linear equation that can be solved in 0(州）．
In other words, the LWE problem is equivalent to solving linear indeterminate equations 
(IEs) with 2n variables in n equations under the condition of finding a small vector of 
elements. 
The following shows algorithms for the most basic lattice-based cryptosystems [4]. 
Here, the messages for encryption have only 1 bit (values O or 1). 
• Parameters 
1. n: dimension of the lattice 
2. q: an odd prime used as the modulus that is sufficiently large for decryption 
3. a: a noise parameter 
• Keys 
1. Public key: Matrix A(E G Ln (lF q) and vector b(E lFい
2. Private key: Vector s satisfying b =As+ e,where e are small vectors, defined 
as those elements sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution whose standard 
deviation and average are set as aq and O respectively. 
• Key generation 
1. Bob selects a matrix A(E G Ln (lF q) uniformly at random. 
2. Bob selects a vector s(E的） uniformly at random. 
3. Bob selects a small vector (as defined above) e. 
4. Bob computes vector b(= As+ e). 
• Encryption 
1. Alice encodes message M(E {O, 1}) tom by corresponding M = 0 tom= 0 and 
M = 1 tom= (q + 1)/2 
3When q is even, the lements are {1 -q/2, • • •, -1, 0, 1, • • •, q/2} or { -q/2, • • •, -1, 0, 1, • • •, q/2 -1}. 
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2. Alice creates a small vector r. 
3. Alice computes C1 =せA.
4. Alice computes C2 =召b-m. Note that召bis a scalar. 
5. Alice sends the ciphertext (C1, ら） to the receiver. 
• Decryption 
1. Bob computes C1s -C2, which equals -rT e + m as
叫—凸＝召As -rrb + m = rT(As -b) + m = -rT e + m. 
2. Bob decodes M = 0 or M = 1 depending on whether c belongs to the set 
{-(q + 1)/4 < c < (q+ 1)/4}. See Figure 3. 
＿戸e+(q+l)/2 -r惰+O -rre+(q+1)12 
トー―---( ． ) ., 
-(q+l)/2 -(q+l)/4 ゜
(q+l)/ 4 (q+l)/2 - 畢 暑M=l M=O M=l 
Figure 3: Decryption in lattice-based cryptosystems 
Here we assume ， 
-(q + 1)/4 < -r怜 <(q+l)/4
by setting parameters q and a. 
To define parameters n, q, and a, lattice reduction algorithms such as LLL [5], BKZ [6], 
or BKZ 2.0 [7] should be considered; these are currently the most efficient algorithms for 
finding the shortest or closest vector belonging to a given lattice A. New Hope [8], an NIST 
candidate for lattice-based cryptography, applies a method called the "2016 Estimate" to 
evaluate security in parameter estimation. Table 1 shows recommended secure parameters 




Table 1: Performance in lattice-based cryptosystems 
Data size (bytes) 
Public key I Private key I Ciphertext 
928 869 1088 
Process time (kilo-cycles) 
Encryption I Decryption I Keygen 
449 116 300 
This table shows that public key sizes are much larger than in RSA, which requires 
256 bytes. 
41
3.2 Code-based cryptosystems 
Code-based cryptosystems are designed using error-correcting codes capable of removing 
noise added to the communication channel. Their security depends on the Learning Parity 
with Noise (LPN) problem, which is related to decoding problem for linear codes. 
Let x be a distribution of lF2 and s elements of lF~. We then define a probabilistic 
function O s,x (called an "oracle") as follows. Oracle 0ふxselects a from lF~uniformly at 
random and samples e from lF2 according to distribution X・Then, Os,x outputs (a, b) such 
that b = s• aT + e. The computational LPN problem LP Nx requires a solution s from 
the (a, b)s output by oracle Os,x・If we limit n samples from the oracle Os,x, we call this 
problem LP Nx,n , which is believed to be hard. 
The LP Nx,n problem is equivalent to solving the linear equation 
sA+e = b, 
where A= (a1 T, a乳 ··•,aげ） and b= (b1, b2, ・ ・ ,b砂.This is similar to the LWE prob-
lem described in section 3.1, the difference being that elements of A, e, ands belong to 
恥 insteadof lFq, where q isa positive integer more than one. LPN is thus a special case 
of LWE. 
The following shows keys and algorithms for the McEliece code-based cryptosystem [10]. 
• Parameters 
1. t: minimum Hamming distance of the code 
2. k, n: size of the code generator matrix 
• Keys 
1. Private key 
-S: a regular matrix in GLk(lF2) 
-P: an n x n permutation matrix that permutes n elements of vectors. This 
permutation matrix is defined as a square matrix that transforms any vector 
to a vector with its elements permutated, such as 
on) o 〗ら）（［］ら）
ー屯 anerror correcting algorithm corresponding to generator matrix G 
2. Public key: a code generator matrix G'(E M (n, k; lFり） such that G'= SGP 
• Key generation 
1. Bob selects a binary (n x k)-linear code C that can correct t-bit errors. Code C 
must have an efficient decoding algorithm and generator matrix G. 
2. Bob creates generator matrix G corresponding to code C. 
3. Bob selects regular matrix S(E GLk(lF2)) uniformly at random. 
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4. Bob selects an n x n permutation matrix P uniformly at random. 
5. Bob computes G1(= SGP). 
• Encryption 
1. Alice encodes k-bit message Minto k-dimensio叫 binaryvector m. 
2. Alice selects n-dimensional binary vector e uniformly at random. 
3. Alice computes ciphertext c as mG 〶 e.
4. Alice sends ciphertext c to Bob. 
• Decryption 
1. Bob computes cP-1, which equals mSG① eP-1. 
2. Bob obtains mS by applying decoding algorithm w() to cP-1. Notice that the 
Hamming weight of eP-1 equals that of e. 
3. Bob computes m by m = (mS)S―1. 
4. Bob recovers the original message M from m. 
Parameters n, k, t are defined to be resistant against the following known attack algo-
rithms. 
The lattice reduction algorithms described in section 3.1 remain practical, since the 
LPN problem is a special case of the LWE problem. The BKW algorithm is particularly 
applicable to the LPN problem. The BKW algorithm aims to detect s; (element i of s 
) from given samples (a, b). Let u1 be a unit vector (1, 0, 0, ・ ・ ,0). Given many (u1, b) 
samples, we can detect variable s1 from b =釘十 eby a majority decision, since many 
e values are expected to be O according to the distribution X・We can collect many 
such samples by using linear algebra for translation [1]. Levieil and Fouque [12] further 
improved this attack. 
Therefore, these parameters in code-based cryptosystems tends to be larger than those 
in lattice cryptosystems. Table 2 shows the parameters and performance of the Classic 




Table 2: Performance of code-based cryptosystems 
Data size (bytes) 
Public key I Private key I Ciphertext 
261,120 6,452 128 
Process time (kilo-cycles) 
Encryption I Decryption I Keygen 
47 138 208,146 
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3.3 Multivariate cryptosystems 
Multivariate cryptosystem security depends on the hardness of solving nonlinear multi-
variate equations on a finite field lF q, such as 
Ji (x1, 砂，...'Xn) = C1 
h(x1,X2,・・・,Xn) = C2 
fm(X1, 四，・・・,Xn) = Cm ' 
(3) 
where fi(x1, x2, ・ ・ ,x砂(i= 1,・ ・ ,m) are multivariate polynomials with n variables. In 
this section, x denotes variable vector (xぃx2,・ ・ ,xn) and .f/(x) denotes multivariate 
equations as in Equation (3). Solving nonlinear multivariate equations over lF2 is a well-
known NP-hard problem. The multivariate cryptosystem employs a quadratic polynomial 
as the multivariate polynomial and binary field lF 2 as the finite field. During encryption, 
n-bit plaintext is embedded in vector (M1, M2, ・ ・ ,M砂inlF~and substituted into vector 
(xぃ砂，・ ・ ・, Xn)-We then obtain ciphertext (c1, c2, ・・・,en) as the result of the substitu-
tion according to the equations in Equation (3), where the public key is multivariate 
polynomials fi(x) (i = 1,・ ・ ,m). Recovering the plaintext by solving these equations is 
generally NP-hard. If we can take any multivariate equationsク(x)as a public key, this 
cryptosystem is secure by NP-hardness. However, note that we cannot decode the cipher-
text without its private key. In multivariate cryptosystems, this private key consists of 
multivariate equations§'(x), which are easy to solve, and two matrices S(E Gに (lFけ）
and T(E GL』腐）） • The public key is then established as 
.f/(x) = So§'o T(x). 
The simplest example of constructing easy-to-solve equations is using a series of poly-
nomials with sequentially fewer variables: 
f~(x1,X2,···,Xn) = C1 
丘(x2,・ ・ ,X砂 C2 
(4) 
fいn (xn-I心） Cn-1 
(xn) Cn 
The last equation f以Xn)= Cn is univariate. We easily obtain solutions Sn by applying 
polynomial factorization, whose computational complexity is polynomial. To obtain so-
lutions Sn-I, we substitute Sn into Xn in the next-to-last equation fい(Xn-l,Xn) = Cn-l, 
then obtain a univariate equation that can be similarly solved. By repeating this, we can 
find solutions (s1, s2, ・ ・ ,sn) by solving in order from the bottom. Given several solutions 
s; in each step i, we must branch and search for each solution. 
The above is summarized as follows: 
• p紅 ameters
1. n: the number of variables 
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2. m: the number of equations 
• Keys 
1. Private key 
ーク(x):easy-to-solve multivariate equations 
-S: an invertible matrix in GLm(恥）
-T: an invertible matrix in GLn(lF2) 
2. Public key: Multivariate equations .f/(x) such that .f/(x) = So§'o T(x) 
• Key generation 
1. Bob generates easy-to-solve multivariate equationダ (x).
2. Bob creates an invertible m x m atrix S. 
3. Bob creates an invertible n x n matrix T. 
4. Bob computes ff(x) = So§o T(x). 
• Encryption 
1. Alice encodes n-bit message M into n-dimensional binary vector M. 
2. Alice substitutes n-dimensional binary vector M into public key .f/(x) and ob-
tains the result c as a ciphertext. That is, c = .f/(M). 
3. Alice sends the ciphertext c to Bob. 
• Decryption 
1. Bob computes c'= T-1(c), which eq叫 sff'(S(x)). 
2. Bob solves the equation§'(S(x)) = c'and obtains solution s. Note that 
S(M) = s. 
3. Bob recovers the original message M by calculating s-1(s). 
The size of public key .f/(x) can be defined as the total size of the coefficients including 
polynomials .f/(x). The polynomials include n equations, and each equation has (n + 
l)(n + 2)/2 coefficients4. The size is then n(n + l)(n + 2)/2. To avoid brute force attacks, 
we should make n greater than or equal to 128, so we can estimate the size as more than 
one megabit. 
There are other methodologies for constructing easy-to-solve quadratic multivariate 
equations. The Matsumoto―Imai cryptosystem employs a univariate field equation whose 
solution is an element of extension field lF2n [14]. Note that we can use an efficient 
polynomial factorization algorithm to solve this univariate field equation in polynomial 
time. Required solutions (s1, ・ ・ ,sn) can be mapped to an element of lF 2n as 
n-1 
W : (s1, ・・・，％）一ど疇＼
i=O 
4Each equation has n(n + 1)/2 quadratic terms, n linear terms, and one constant term. 
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where {1, /3, 尻・・・,13n-I} is a base of lF2n. When obtaining solution~n i=l s;/3'by solv-
ing field equation, we can recover (sぃ• • •, sn) by w-1. In this case, matrices S and T 
are used to keep the field equation secret by linear translation of the variables. The 
Matsumoto-Imai cryptosystem and related systems are thus called hidden field-equation 
(HFE) cryptosystems. 
However, Faugもresuggested that Grabner-basis calculations invalidate these linear 
translations [15]. Multivariate cryptosystems thus should increase the number of equations 
or variables, contributing to larger public keys. 
4 Problems in post-quantum cryptosystems 
As described in the previous section, a common problem in leading PQCs is their large 
public keys. This section discusses the reasons for this. 
4.1 Linearity in public-key cryptosystems 
RSA requires a 2048-bit public key, which is shorter than those for PQCs. This is because 
the underlying integer factorization problem is equivalent to finding a nontrivial integer 
solution to the equation xy = N. This is a particular problem related to nonlinear 
indeterminate equations(IEs) called the Diophantine problem, which is well known to 
be unsolvable in general. However, as described in section 1, there are known efficient 
quantum-computing algorithms for solving only xy = N types of equations. 
The underlying problems of lattice-based and code-based cryptosystems are linear IEs, 
which are NP-hard under the condition of finding the smallest solution. However, these 
problems are solvable in real time when we choose a low dimension. Due to well-known 
efficient algorithms such as LLL and BKZ mentioned in section 3.1, the cryptosystem 
must have dimensions of at least 512 to be secure. This contributes to larger public key 
sizes. 
For a public key, multivariate cryptosystems use large equations constructed from 
easy-to-solve equations by applying linear translations Sand T. Further, more equations 
or variables are needed for security, because linear translations can be invalidated by 
calculating Grabner bases. 
Therefore, a common problem among the leading PQCs is linearity in the computa-
tionally hard problems that these PQCs rely on. Reducing public key size would allow 
implementation on low-end devices, and also contribute to power savings by reducing 
processing costs. 
4.2 An approach toward nonlinear cryptosystems 
In 2006, Couveignes proposed a nonlinear key exchange scheme designed using isogeny 
maps of elliptic curves defined on a quadratic extension field lF q [16]. Security in this 
scheme depends on finding pr?blems for the isogeny map and its kernel from two given 
distinct elliptic curves E and E. This scheme has been extended to public key cryptosys-
tems [17] and signature scheme [18]. Supersingular isogeny key encapsulation is one such 
46
improved public key cryptosystem, and uses short public keys. However, the encryption 
and decryption processes take time due to calculations for multi-precision. 
This section introduces a research approach that depends on solving IE problems as 
IE problem: Find a solution s = (s1, ・ ・ ,sn) (n 2: 2) to the indeterminate equation 
X(x) = 0 inring R, where x = (xぃ・ • ・,xn) (n 2: 2). All coefficients and variants 
are in ring R. 
The IE problem has been proven to be unsolvable when ring R is a polynomial ring 
応[t].Indeterminate equation cryptosystems (IEC) are schemes that depend on problems 
related to IEs, where the public key is an indeterminate equation X(x) and the private 
key is its solutions= (s1, ・ ・ ,sn)-
Giophantus+ is the latest IEC depending on the IE problem on Rq[t], where Rq is 
defined as lF孔t]/(tn+ 1). The IE problem on R孔t]is easy, so Giophantus+ employs the 
problem of finding the smallest solution to IEs as a computationally hard problem. Here, 
"small" means al coefficients are in the range Rt= {O, 1, ・ ・ ,£-1}, where l isa small 
integer such as 4. Rt is a subset of Rq. 
The ciphertext presents a polynomial c(x) in Rふ]described as c(x) = m+X(x)r(x)+ 
JI,・e(x). The first term m is an element of Rt embedded with plaintext and the second 
term X(x)r(x) is the product of polynomial X(x), that is, the public key, and a random 
polynomial r(x). The last term JI,• e(x) is a polynomial that can be eliminated after 
substituting the private key for c(x). More details are described in [19, 20]. 
However, an attack called the linear algebra attack can target this scheme. This attack 
allows us to find the coefficients of polynomials e(x) and r(x), and thus m, by solving 
linear equations created by coefficient comparison of c and m + X(x)r(x) +JI,• e(x). This 
is possible due to the linearity of the ciphertext. 
5 Conclusion 
This article surveyed some leading PQCs and described how a common problem is their 
large public key sizes. We discussed how the reason for this is linearity in the computa-
tionally hard problems that their security relies on. PQCs will no doubt play a central 
role in cyber-physical systems (CPS) that will be developed and will make life more con-
venient. CPS will require post-quantum public key cryptosystems that have low power 
requirements and are small enough to install in low-end devices such as sensors. It is 
therefore necessary to design PQCs whose security is based on inherently hard nonlinear 
problems such as solving Diophantine equations. 
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